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In 1993 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) argued that 
political instability, economic tensions, ethnic conflict and environmental degradation directly 
correlated to mass movements of refugees throughout the developing world.1  While some 
researchers assert that individuals displaced by environmental degradation are the largest single 
class of refugees, these individuals lack official standing and protection accorded to others 
avoiding political persecution and violent conflict.2  Environmental degradation and its 
corresponding flows of displaced persons may pose a significant threat to national security in 
developing countries.  Yet, the impact of these individuals on internal and external security is 
unclear as persons fleeing environmental change are unaccounted for in official refugee 
statistics.      
In this paper we argue that there is a paucity of theoretical and empirical evidence 
supporting the hypothesized linkage between environmental degradation and national security.  
Researchers and policy makers alike have been unable to reach consensus on what constitutes 
environmental, human, and national security as well as what, if any, relationships exist between 
these variables.  Understanding this debate is important for policymakers attempting to cope with 
environmental change (degradation, natural disasters, and climate change) and demographic 
change (population growth, migration, and urbanization).  In order to develop a comprehensive 
national security strategy, developing nations may need to build their capacities to address these 
                                                 
1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.  The State of the World’s Refugees: The Challenge of 
Protection. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1993. 
2 Jacobson, Jodi L. Environmental refugees: a yardstick of habitability. Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, 
1988.; Homer-Dixon, Thomas. “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict.”  
International Security 16, No. 2 (1991): 76-116.; Sadik, Nafis.  “Population Growth and Global Stability,” in 
Population and global security. Nicholas Polunin, ed., 1-2, 12. Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998, among others. 
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environmental and demographic factors both individually, as well as the ways in which they 
relate to existing, conventional threats to national security. 
We examine the national security issues resulting from environmental transformation and 
demographic change in Latin America.  If environmental degradation and the national security of 
Latin American countries are linked, then policymakers must take these linkages into account 
when formulating economic and social policy.  Omitting these factors from national security 
strategy discussions may overstate the risks associated with other threats and lead to a biased 
allocation of public resources.  On the other hand, if these threats are overstated (or non-
existent), then incorporating them into national security discussions may divert attention and 
resources from issues of importance.  Given the relatively fragile nature of many Latin American 
economies, accurately addressing these threats is imperative for economic and social stability 
and security. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  We first discuss the lack of 
consensus in the literature on the meaning of the term environmental security.  Second, we 
consider the demographic composition and trends in Latin America.  Third, we review 
demographic change and its relation to environmental security.  We then examine environmental 
transformations as they relate to population and security.  The last section concludes and offers 
suggestions for future research. 
 
Environmental change and national security  
While environmental degradation emerged in the second half of the 20th century as a 
focal point of political contention, its influence on official US national security policy is much 
more recent.  Environmental degradation has been the focus of significant and regulatory efforts 
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in the United States, but the concept of environmental security has only recently entered public 
discourse and security documents.  In 1991, the US National Security Strategy (NSS) included 
environmental security as a concern for the first time.3  Environmental security’s importance 
increased during the Clinton administration with the explicit incorporation of environmental 
objectives in the NSS.  In 1996, for example, Secretary of State Warren Christopher asserted 
that, “environmental initiatives can be important, low-cost, high-impact tools in promoting our 
national security interests.” 4  The 2002 National Security Strategy noted the need to address 
environmental concerns in trade negotiations and the impact of environmental threats on the 
welfare of citizens.5  Curiously, environmental security has become part of the national security 
discourse despite a lack of consensus among academics and policymakers regarding the 
existence of a significant linkage between environmental security and national security.     
 The inclusion of environmental security threats may be a reflection of the purported 
declining relevance of traditional symmetric threats to national security and the emergence of 
asymmetric and non-conventional threats. While much of the early literature on environmental 
security is general and anecdotal in nature, it posits a discernable linkage between environmental 
degradation and, in turn, national security.6  Whether such a linkage exists, the direction of the 
                                                 
3  In the August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States, in the section entitled “Our Interests and 
Objectives in the 1990s” states that “favorable to the United States, its interests and its allies” is to “achieve 
cooperative international solutions to key environmental challenges, assuring the sustainability and environmental 
security of the planet as well as growth and opportunity for all.”  
4 Richard, Matthew A.  “Integrating Environmental Factors into Conventional Security,” in Environment and 
security: discourses and practices.  Miriam R. Lowi and Brian Robert Shaw, 33-34. New York: St. Martin's Press, 
2000. 
5 Office of the President of the United States of America. The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America.  September 2002.  http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html [date accessed: 08/09/04] 
6 See Brown, Lester R.  “Worldwatch Paper #14 Redefining National Security.” Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch 
Institute, 1977.; Myers, Norman. “Environment and Security.” Foreign Policy, 74. (Spring 1989): 23-41; Mathews, 
Jessica T. “Redefining Security,” Foreign Affairs 68, No.2 (1989): 162-177.; and Renner, Michael. “Environment 
and Security.” in Chapter 8, Enhancing Global Security in State of the World 1989. Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch 
Institute, 1989. 
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linkage (uni or bi-directional), and the magnitude of the relationship remains a matter of debate.7   
There is also a paucity of advice on how to translate this purported relationship into policy 
guidance on the environment and non-conventional threats.8   
What is meant by ‘environmental degradation’?   Environmental degradation is “any 
change or disturbance to the environment that is perceived to be deleterious or undesirable.”9   
While many academics accept this seemingly simple and succinct definition, “the logical 
combination of the current definitions of environment and degradation...is open to a variety of 
legitimate interpretations”, and the application of the term (or lack thereof) is a matter of 
debate.10  The problem of environmental degradation refers to the totality of a wide range of 
interdependent processes occurring at a range of scales, in different places, with differing 
degrees of impact.  These processes include, among others, atmospheric pollution and climate 
change, biodiversity loss, soil loss, salinization and acidification of soils and water, fisheries 
depletion and contamination of plants and animals by synthetic and radioactive substances.11  
Environmental degradation may increase the probability and intensity of conflict as resource 
scarcities increase, economic opportunities dwindle, and state institutions decline in 
effectiveness.  
                                                 
7 See Homer-Dixon, Thomas.  “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict.”  
International Security  16 (1991): 76-116.; Homer-Dixon, Thomas.  “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: 
Evidence from Cases.”  International Security 19, No.1 (1994): 5-40.; Libiszewski, Stephan.  “What is 
Environmental Conflict?”  Occasional Paper of the Environment and Conflicts Project (ENCOP).  Zurich: Center 
for Security Studies and Conflict Research, No. 1, 1992.; and Baechler, Gunther.  “Desertification and Conflict: The 
Marginalization of Poverty and of Environmental Conflict.”  Occasional Paper of the Environment and Conflicts 
Project (ENCOP).  Zurich: Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, No. 10, 1994.    
8 Lonegran, Steve.  “Human Security, Environmental Security and Sustainable Development,” in Environment and 
security: discourses and practices. Miriam R. Lowi and Brian Robert Shaw, 66-67. New York: St. Martin's Press, 
2000. 
9 Johnson, D.L., S.H. Ambrose, T.J. Bassett, M.L. Bowen, D.E. Crummey, J.S. Isaacson, D.N. Johnson, P. Lamb, 
M. Saul, and A.E. Winter-Nelson.  Meanings of environmental terms. Journal of Environmental Quality 26, No. 3 
(1997): 581-589.  
10 Brün, M. and G.F. McIsaac. Natural Environment and Human Culture: Defining Terms and Understanding World 
Views. Journal of Environmental Quality, 28 (Jan/Feb 1999): 1-10. 
11 Barnett, Jon. The meaning of environmental security: environmental politics and policy in the new security era. 
New York, New York: Zed Books, 2001. 
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We would be remiss, however, if we did not note that environmental quality might 
initially decline with economic development, only to improve after the population reaches a 
certain threshold of income.  Market forces may induce improvements in public institutional 
quality, a strengthening of property rights, and other factors that improve environmental quality 
successfully avoiding the tragedy of the commons.  While obviously controversial, empirical 
evidence appears to support the assertions, casting doubt on the environmental degradation-
conflict relationship.  Whether an emerging region such as Latin America can achieve this 
income threshold before degradation harms development remains unknown.12   
Comprising nearly thirty percent of the world’s total territory, Latin America and the 
Caribbean region has the world’s largest reserves of arable land and sixteen percent of the 
world’s degraded lands (1900 million hectares), ranking it third behind Asia and the Pacific and 
Africa.13  The pace of human-induced forms of environmental degradation and resource 
depletion appears to have increased throughout Latin America due to a combination of 
increasing demand for agricultural products, improving means of exploitation and the lagging 
pace of conservation and control.14  Coupled with natural changes in the environment, the last 
half of the twentieth century witnessed a gradual increase in the pace of deforestation, land 
degradation, erosion, salinity and desertification in Latin America. 15  Erosion, a main cause of 
land degradation, now affects 14.3 percent of the territory in Latin America and 26 percent in 
                                                 
12 Grossman, Gene M., and Alan B. Krueger. Environmental Impacts of a North American Free Trade Agreement.  
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3914. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research in “Environmental Turning Points, Institutions, and the Race to the Top.” Bruce Yandle. The Independent 
Review: A Journal of Political Economy 9, No. 2. (Fall 2004): 211-226. 
13 United Nations Environment Programme. “State of the Environment and Policy Retrospective: 1972-2002” in 
Global Environmental Outlook 3: Past, Present and Future Perspectives.  United Nations Environment Programme, 
29-300. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2002. 
14 Hillstrom, Kevin, and Laurie Collier Hillstrom. Latin America and the Caribbean: a continental overview of 
environmental issues. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2004.  
15 Lonegran, Dr. Steve. The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population Displacement.  Global 
Environmental Change and Human Security Project: Research Report 1 (2nd Edition).  Victoria, B.C: University of 
Victoria.  (July 1998). 
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Central America.16  Human-induced land degradation and water shortages directly affect 
economic sufficiency in many rural areas.   
While human-induced environmental degradation appears to directly impact the well-
being of individuals, there again is a paucity of empirical evidence with respect to this 
hypothesis.  First, there is a problem of measurement in that environmental degradation may 
appear to be accelerating when, in fact, improved measurement methods are merely refining our 
estimates of degradation.  Second, environmental degradation’s influence may be more subtle 
and indirect than previously thought.  Degradation may indirectly impact economic growth, for 
example, through its potential influence on income inequality, economic efficiency, and other, as 
yet unexplored, variables.  Development projects, mainly dams and irrigation projects, provide a 
more salient example of the purported linkages between environmental degradation and human 
development.  The World Bank estimates that development projects uproot more than 10 million 
people in the developing world each year.17  Many large-scale development projects often 
involve forced resettlement, which directly influences the distribution and income of a subset of 
the population.18  Improvements in the utilization of natural resources (eg power generation and 
irrigation) may either cause or potentially offset environmental degradation.  In turn, the 
simultaneous input of environmental degradation and economic development may also influence 
national security in an unknown fashion. Before proceeding to a discussion of the relationship 
                                                 
16 United Nations Environment Programme. “State of the Environment and Policy Retrospective: 1972-2002” in 
Global Environmental Outlook 3: Past, Present and Future Perspectives.  United Nations Environment Programme, 
29-300. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2002. 
17 World Bank. Social Policy and Resettlement Division. Resettlement and development: the bankwide review of 
projects involving involuntary resettlement, 1986-1993. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, Environment Dept., 1996. 
According to the World Bank’s FAQ, this is the most thorough and current review of the Bank resettlement 
experience. http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/65ByDocName/FAQs [accessed  9/20/04] 
18 Myers, Norman.  Environmental Exodus: An Emergent Crisis in the Global Arena.  Washington, D.C.: Climate 
Institute, 1995. 
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between environmental transformation, demographic change and national security, we must first, 
however, attempt to define national and environmental security.  
What is national security?  We believe that the contentious (and somewhat vague) nature 
of the debate in the literature can be, in part, attributed to the various interpretations of the terms 
‘national security’ and ‘environmental security.’  The interdisciplinary nature of the potential 
linkages between environmental degradation, human security, and national security has further 
complicated discussion of the terms. Academics and policymakers not only disagree as to 
whether environmental concerns should be defined as a national security issue, but also, more 
importantly, they debate the meaning of the terms human and environmental security.   
Academics and national security specialists continue to discuss, sometimes contentiously, 
the definition of national security as well as what constitutes a national security threat.  While the 
debate over an explicit definition of national security continues, the literature, apparently has 
reached consensus over its more general idea and appropriate response to threats.  National 
security is any issue that may dramatically impact the welfare of a sovereign state and any 
response to the threat must be centrally coordinated by the state.19  
Central coordination, in this view, is necessary due to the negative spillovers represented 
by these threats; spillovers that could not be adequately captured by a market response 
mechanism.  Even if the threats were asymmetrically distributed (New York and California, for 
example, but not the Midwest) a decentralized response would likely fail to adequately protect 
the state due to negative externalities.  An adequate response requires central coordination, even 
if such a response represents an over-provision of the public good in some jurisdictions.  Any 
economic inefficiency due to the misallocation of resources is viewed as small, relative to the 
potential cost of a threat to national security.  
                                                 
19 Porter, Gareth. “Environmental Security as a National Security Issue.”  Current History (May 1995): 218-222. 
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We argue that the set of issues now classified as threats to national security has 
significantly expanded from an almost singular focus on military readiness to one encompassing 
regional and global military threats, economic and political concerns, and most recently, 
environmental degradation and resource scarcities.20 Whether such an expansion is prudent, 
remains a point of contention.  The inclusion of environmental concern and objectives starting 
with the 1991 National Security Strategy (NSS) typifies this debate.  Critics have argued that the 
inclusion of environmental concerns in the national security strategy is counter-productive, and 
promotes neither environmental nor security concerns.21  Proponents of environmental concerns 
appear to support this line of reasoning by arguing that the national security specialists develop 
national security strategy documents from a military, rather than an environmental, perspective.  
Military responses to environmental concerns are not only inappropriate, but they also bias the 
state’s response if the environmental issues are classified as a national security concern.  In 
essence, this argument suggests the environmental issues are of national importance but the NSS 
is the wrong vehicle to align these issues with national strategic objectives.  We thus observe 
arguments not only where environmental issues are national security issues, but also whether 
classifying these issues as a national security concern biases the response.  
Including environmental concerns in national security documents also explicitly 
promotes the primacy of central government institutions, even if a centrally coordinated response 
is allocatively and technically inefficient.  Environmental threats are likely to have asymmetric 
impacts and a uniform response may be economically inefficient relative to differentiated 
                                                 
20 Redclift, Michael. “Environmental Security and the Recombinant Human: Sustainability in the Twenty-first 
Century.”  Environmental Values, 10. (2001): 289-299. & “Whither Environmental Security in the Post- September 
11th Era?  Assessing the Legal, Organizational, and Policy Challenges for the National Security State.” Public 
Administration Review, 62 (September 2002 Special). 
21 Haas, Peter M. “Constructing Environmental Conflicts from Resource Scarcity.” Global Environmental Politics 2, 
No.1 (February 2002): 1-11. 
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provision by subnational governments.  The NSS may not only be the improper vehicle for 
environmental concerns, but a uniform response may also create inefficiencies that outweigh the 
costs of addressing the environmental concerns.  These questions, examined in the fiscal 
decentralization literature on the assignment of revenue and expenditure authority to subnational 
governments, have not been examined to the best of our knowledge in the national security 
literature. 
What is meant by ‘human security’?  If there is a lack of consensus in the literature as to 
the definition and application of national security, it should come as no surprise that a similar, 
even more contentious debate exists with respect to human security.  Initially, human security 
pertained to physical threats to an individual.22  The concept of human security has, much like 
national security, evolved to encompass economic, health and environmental concerns.  As the 
definition of human security evolved, its precise definition lost meaning and the debate as to its 
application increased in volume.  The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), for 
example, argues that human security is an ‘integrative’ rather than merely a ‘defensive’ concept, 
encompassing a broad range of economic, political, and social concerns.23   If actually applied, 
the UNDP’s definition could classify almost every activity as a component of human security.  
Furthermore, the UNDP argues that existing challenges to human security are global and require 
                                                 
22 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN in 1948, states that “everyone has the right to 
life, liberty and the security of person.” 
23 Lonegran, et al.  Global Environmental Change and Human Security (GECHS) Science Plan.  International 
Human Dimensions Program, Report No. 11: Bonn, Germany.  (June 1999): 25. The UNDP’s definition of human 
security includes seven categories of threats: economic security (assured basic income); food security (physical and 
economic access to food); health security; environmental security (in terms of access to potable water, clean air and 
non-degraded land); personal security (security from physical violence and threats); community security (security 
from ethnic cleansing); political security (protection of basic human rights and freedoms).   
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international response.24  Implicit in this argument is that governments are, to some extent, 
responsible for ensuring human security, however broadly defined. 
The UNDP, however, also notes that human security should not be equated with human 
development.  Following this logic, the Global Environmental Change and Human Security 
(GECHS) program suggests that a nation achieves human security when individuals and 
communities have the options necessary to end, mitigate or adapt to threats to their human, 
environmental and social rights; have the capacity and freedom to exercise these options; and 
actively participate in attaining these options.  Moreover, human security can be achieved 
through challenging the structures and processes that contribute to insecurities.25  While 
optimistic from a national security perspective in a global environment with asymmetric threats, 
and again, overly broad from an application perspective, the GECHS argument sets a standard 
(albeit, some might argue, unachievable) against which we can measure human security.  
Whether such a standard is acceptable to all stakeholders is doubtful, given the relatively broad 
definition of human security and its suggested measure.  The GECHS definition of human 
security is arguably not useful from a national security perspective as it suggests that almost 
every form of human security should be considered a national security objective. 
What is meant by the term ‘environmental security’? Given ambiguity and contention 
surrounding the discourses of national and human security, it should not be surprising that a 
similar debate is ongoing with respect to environmental security’s definition and application.  
Academics and security specialists alike contest the cornerstone of the environmental security 
                                                 
24 UNDP considers the following global human security threats: unchecked population growth, excessive migration, 
environmental degradation, disparities in economic opportunities, drug protection and trafficking, terrorism.    
25 Lonegran, et al.  Global Environmental Change and Human Security (GECHS) Science Plan.  International 
Human Dimensions Program, Report No. 11: Bonn, Germany.  (June 1999): 25-26.    
UNDP holds that “human development is a broader concept, defined as a process of widening the range of people’s 
choices.  Human security means that people can exercise these choices safely and freely.” 
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discourse: resource scarcity contributes to inter and intra-state conflict.  Some in the literature 
argue that inter-state conflict resulting from resource scarcity is unlikely.  Not only is resource-
driven interstate conflict unlikely, some in the literature hold that interstate spillovers associated 
with internal resource conflicts are even more unlikely to occur.  Academics view discussions 
attempting to link resource scarcities with interstate security issues, at best, as unproductive and 
harmful to policy development.26  Likewise, these same people view attempts to integrate 
security discussions within the dialogue of sustainable development as unrealistic given its 
holistic approach. Finally, academics tend to dismiss evidence on the environment’s potential 
degradation.  One can posit, of course, that resource scarcity is playing a role in Dafur’s ongoing 
conflict and the potential exists for substantial negative spillovers into Sudan’s neighbors.  
While some argue that a link exists between environmental factors and violent conflict, 
they feel that environmental issues are unlikely to cause significant conflict between sovereign 
states.27  From this perspective, resource scarcity, although not the catalyst for conflict, 
exacerbates its likelihood in areas that are prone to it for non-environmental reasons.  The 
emerging line of research on the economics of conflict suggests that low rates of economic 
growth, a rapidly increasing population, and monoculture export dependence positively 
influences the likelihood of intra-state conflict. 28  We note that the literature skirts the issue of 
environmental security due to, in part, its ambiguous nature.  Obviously the same factors that the 
literature suggests will influence the likelihood of conflict will also likely influence the state and 
evolution of the environment.  The state of the environment, in turn, will likely influence these 
                                                 
26 Haas, Peter M. “Constructing Environmental Conflicts from Resource Scarcity.” Global Environmental Politics 2, 
No.1 (February 2002): 1-11. 
27 Dalby, Simon. “Conflict, Ecology and the Politics of Environmental Security.” Global Environmental Politics 2, 
No. 4 (November 2002): 25-130. 
28 Goldstone, Jack A. “Demography, Environment, and Security.” in Environmental Conflict. Diehl, Paul and Nils 
Petter Gleditsch, eds. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 2001. Also cite Collier, too. 
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causal variables, suggesting that an endogenous relationship exists between the environment, 
economic conditions, and the likelihood of conflict.  The literature largely leaves unaddressed 
the potential endogeneity between these variables, casting doubt on the efficacy of the empirical 
estimates and the conclusion that environmental degradation causes violent conflict. 
Another area of ambiguity in the literature is the differentiation between environmental 
factors that generate violent and nonviolent conflict.  Traditionally, security issues are associated 
with violent conflict.  Nonviolent environmental and demographic security issues potentially can 
spill over international borders, impinging on the traditional security realm, regardless of their 
likelihood to cause violent conflict.  We cannot begin to adequately discern the linkages between 
environmental security and conflict until we are able to separate and analyze the impact of the 
environment on nonviolent and violent conflict.  Obviously, pooling violent and nonviolent 
conflicts in the empirical analysis can introduce bias as to the relationship between 
environmental security, conflict, and, in turn national security.    
Even if disagreement exists as to the definition and application of the term 
‘environmental security,’ one might believe that the term ‘environmental refugee’ is sufficiently 
precise to be devoid of contention.  As with national, human, and environmental security, there is 
substantial disagreement over the need for the term ‘environmental refugee’ and its subsequent 
definition.  The UNHCR’s definition of a refugee primarily concerns itself with persecution due 
to race, religion, nationality, social standing, or political opinion and does not address emigration 
due to environmental insecurity.29 
                                                 
29 UNHCR Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 1 A(2), 1951.  Any person with a 
“well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of 
his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
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The absence of environmental conditions in the UNHCR refugee definition makes legally 
permissible a signatory state’s refusal to acknowledge, shelter or offer asylum to individuals 
fleeing environmental degradation.  Even if such a condition existed in international protocol, 
internal migration would not be covered by such a protocol.  Individuals displaced by 
environmental degradation will likely lack the standing of individuals displaced by more 
conventional forms of persecution. 
El-Hinnawi argued that an environmental refugee is an individual who has been forced to 
leave their traditional habitat because of a marked environmental disruption that would seriously 
affect their quality of life or existence. 30  Following this definition, one would classify an 
individual as an environmental refugee if they were internally or externally displaced in response 
to substantial changes in the environment, which, according to El-Hinnawi’s research, is unable 
to support human life. The literature leaves open for interpretation, of course, the personal 
threshold for response to evolving environmental conditions and substantial ecosystem changes. 
Utilizing this definition, an environmental refugee could be any number of people forced to leave 
their home either as a result of environmental degradation, be it natural, such as a hurricane or 
other natural disaster, human-induced, such as deforestation, soil degradation and desertification, 
or accidental, such as an oil spill.  
 Given the overly broad nature of El-Hinnawi’s definition, it is not surprising that 
disagreement persists in the literature on its efficacy.  Castles argues that the term 
‘environmental refugee’ is misleading and possibly harmful given ongoing attempts to restrict 
                                                 
30 El-Hinnawi, Essam E., and United Nations Environment Programme. Environmental refugees. Nairobi, Kenya: 
United Nations Environment Programme, 1985.  El-Hinnawi defined an environmental refugee as “as those people 
who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked 
environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/ or seriously 
affected the quality of their life.  By ‘environmental disruption’ is meant any physical, chemical and/or biological 
changes in the ecosystem (or the resource base) that render it temporarily or permanently, unsuitable to support 
human life.” 
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the UNHCR’s protocol.31  The legal status for those claiming to flee environmental degradation 
provides recipient states with the means to deny shelter, protection, and asylum. Furthermore, 
given the potential interactions of environmental degradation with the socio-economic 
environment, whether environmental degradation provides sufficient justification for an 
individual to claim refugee status remains a point of contention. If environmental refugees were 
to acquire the equal status of other currently recognized refugees, this would, obviously, have a 
significant impact on national security, especially in the United States. 
Left unaddressed in the literature are concise, metric oriented definitions of 
environmental and human security and environmental refugees.  The lack of consensus has 
undoubtedly biased estimates of the number of individuals affected by environmental conditions 
in an uncertain direction.  Solely focusing on environmental conditions as a rationale for 
emigration is likely to overstate the impact of environmental degradation; non-environmental 
conditions, however, clearly influence emigration decisions.  Ignoring environmental 
degradation, likewise, most likely introduces downward bias.  
 
Demographic Change and Environmental Security in Latin America 
Given the lack of consensus in the literature, we now turn to the question of 
environmental security in Latin America.  We highlight potential linkages between the 
environment and national security and areas of ambiguity requiring further research.  We find 
that, as with the literature, a priori bias plays a significant role in determining whether 
demographic change, environmental and national security are linked in Latin America.  We first 
discuss population trends in Latin America before focusing on the issues of migration and 
                                                 
31 Castles, Stephen. “Environmental Change and Forced Migration: Making Sense of the Debate.”  New Issues in 
Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 70. Oxford, England: Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 2002.   
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urbanization. We argue that the demographic trends discussed in this section are more 
pronounced in other developing regions, thus our arguments are as applicable in other countries. 
We conclude with an application of the concepts of this paper to El Salvador.   
The combined population of the Latin American region (including Central America, 
South America, Mexico and the Caribbean states) in mid-2003 was approximately 540 million, 
an increase of approximately 90 percent from 1970.32  While the Latin American population 
growth rate of 2.74% per annum was the highest among developing regions in the 1960s, its 
population growth rate has declined significantly since then.  In 2000, average population growth 
of 1.51% in Latin America exceeded the global average of 1.21%, but lagged behind the 
population growth averages of Sub-Saharan Africa (2.26%), the Middle East and North Africa 
(1.91%), and South Asia (1.73%).  We can attribute these growth rates, in part, to US 
immigration patterns, as well as smaller family sizes throughout the region.  
Average fertility for Latin America and the Caribbean has declined steadily from 5.82 
births per woman between 1960-1969 to 2.51 births per woman in 2000-2003, below the global 
average of 2.63 births per woman during the same period.33  Average infant mortality in the 
Latin American and Caribbean regions has consistently been below developing and global 
averages.34  On the other hand, average life expectancy at birth (total years) in Latin America and 
the Caribbean has consistently been the highest of the developing regions, even exceeding world 
life expectancy averages.35   Although life expectancy has steadily increased in the Latin 
                                                 
32 US Census Bureau, Population Division, International Program Center, International Data Base.  [Accessed  
8/2/04]. 
33 World Bank. World Development Indicators. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Group, 2004. 
34 During the 1960, average infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) in Latin America and the Caribbean was 
102.37 deaths compared to a world average of 122.29 deaths; this rate declined further to 29.63 and 55.85 
respectfully most likely as a result of the AIDS epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa (which has consistently has had the 
highest infant mortality rates globally). 
35 During the 1960s, average life expectancy at birth was 57.78 years in Latin America and the Caribbean with a 
world average of 54.63 years; this has leaped to 70.52 years and 66.60 years respectively between 2000-2003.  
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American and Caribbean regions, the gains have not been homogeneously distributed throughout 
the region.36   
Inter and intra population density varies greatly.  El Salvador, the smallest and most 
densely populated country in Central America, is approximately thirty times denser than the least 
populated country, Belize.37  Consistently, Latin America is the most urbanized region in the 
developing world with the urban population increasing from 52.92 percent of the total in the 
1960s to 75.94 percent between 2000-2003.  Although it only houses 8.4 percent of the world’s 
population, Latin America accounts for some 15 percent of all human beings living in 
settlements of more than 1 million inhabitants.38  El Salvador has approximately 360 million 
urban residents and four metropolitan areas of more than 10 million people; nearly 30 percent of 
the total population resides in cities with more than 1 million inhabitants.39  The institutional 
framework of El Salvadoran development, a leftover from Spanish colonization, is a legacy of 
economic inequality, particularly regarding access to productive resources, such as land.  These 
inequalities, in turn, induce out-migration that shifts pressures to urban areas. Whether these 
migration patterns result in environmental degradation, per se, is a matter of contention.40  
                                                 
36 Note: For example, life expectancy in Cuba and Puerto Rico is fully twenty years greater than in Haiti.  In South 
America, meanwhile, residents of Venezuela and Colombia live, on average, a full decade longer than residents of 
Bolivia.  From: Hillstrom, Kevin, and Laurie Collier Hillstrom. Latin America and the Caribbean: a continental 
overview of environmental issues. Santa Barbara, CA.: ABC-CLIO, 2004.  
37 El Salvador has the highest population density in Central America, with a population density of 288.1 habitants 
per square kilometer in comparison to a regional average of 65.0 habitants per square kilometer. 
38 Bárcena, Alicia, Ricardo Sánchez Sosa, Roberto Guimaraes, United Nations. Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and United Nations Environment Programme. Oficina Regional para América Latina y 
el Caribe. The sustainability of development in Latin America and the Caribbean: challenges and opportunities. 
Santiago de Chile: United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean: United Nations 
Environment Programme, Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2001. 
39 Note: Currently, the urban population of countries in North America and Europe is between 70 and 75 percent, 
roughly equivalent to that of Latin America.  See: UN Center for Human Settlements, 2001; and UN Population 
Division, 2001. 
40 Bilsborrow, Richard and Stupp, Paul.  “Demographic processes, Land, and the Environment in Guatemala,” in 
Demographic diversity and change in the Central American isthmus. Anne R. Pebley, Luis Rosero Bixby, and 
Universidad de Costa Rica. Programa Centroamericano de Población, 582. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997.  
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The rapid growth of urban populations, coupled with the resultant migration of people 
onto previously undeveloped land, burdens municipalities, which, in turn, are unable to provide 
basic infrastructure and public services to their rapidly expanding (and denser) jurisdictions.41 
The region’s cities currently lack the ability to handle the amount of solid waste generated, 
which has doubled over the last thirty years.  Air and water pollution problems plague Latin 
America’s urban centers as well as their proliferating slums.  Severe health and crime issues 
manifest themselves as a result of the increased population density within urban areas. Latin 
America’s evolving demographic composition illustrates how demographic change may 
undermine existing institutions and degrade human health and security.  Whether these changes 
influence national security is an unanswered question. 
Demographic change, however, may not necessarily induce environmental degradation.  
The composition and disposition of the populace may be independent of environmental change. 
If there is no robust empirical linkage between demographic change and environmental 
degradation, then the argument for environmental degradation as a source of violent conflict may 
also be weakened.  What may not be weakened is the argument that environmental degradation 
may induce non-violent conflict.  The literature has yet to explore these empirical hypotheses. 
While environmental degradation may result from demographic shifts, population 
growth, per se, does not necessarily damage the environment, but it may interact with existing 
socio-economic structures to influence environmental quality.42  A fall in the quality and quantity 
of renewable resources combined with population growth may encourage powerful groups 
within a society to shift resource distribution in their favor.  Unequal resource access combined 
                                                 
41 Hillstrom, Kevin, and Laurie Collier Hillstrom. Latin America and the Caribbean : a continental overview of 
environmental issues. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2004.  
42 Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. Environment, scarcity, and violence. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999.; 
Homer-Dixon, Thomas.  “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases.”  International 
Security 19, No. 1 (1994): 5-40. 
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with population pressure may induce migrations to regions that are ecologically fragile, such as 
steep upland slopes, tropical rainforests, and watersheds.  High population densities in these 
areas, combined with a lack of knowledge and capital to protect local resources, often triggers 
environmental degradation and chronic poverty.   Over time, large segments of the society may 
become ecologically and economically marginalized, increasing social instability and 
undermining security.   
The interaction of resource capture and ecological marginalization forms the standard 
argument that population growth may overextend the natural resources of a given geographic 
region, leading to deprivation, conflict and instability.43 The scope of instability resulting from 
population growth may increase as more people try to sustain themselves in ecologically 
marginalized environments.44   While increases in income, democratic governance and 
technology may mitigate the influence of population growth on the environment and, in turn, 
security; population’s effect is not completely absent.  Increases in income and democratic 
governance may, in the short-run, actually increase resource capture and ecological 
marginalization, as seen with respect to NAFTA.45  Increased resource capture and economic 
marginalization may result in a decline in resource quality (if not quantity) and per capita income 
growth.  Slow and negative rates of per capita income growth appear to be associated with 
increased probabilities of conflict, suggesting a linkage between population growth, economic 
development, and national security.  Whether Latin America can increase incomes sufficiently to 
avoid this conflict remains to be seen. 
                                                 
43 Barnett, Jon. The meaning of environmental security: environmental politics and policy in the new security era. 
New York: Zed Books, 2001. 
44 Saunders, John. Population growth in Latin America and U.S. national security. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986. 
45 Grossman, Gene M., and Alan B. Krueger. Environmental Impacts of a North American Free Trade Agreement.  
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3914. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research in “Environmental Turning Points, Institutions, and the Race to the Top.” Bruce Yandle. The Independent 
Review: A Journal of Political Economy 9, No. 2. (Fall 2004): 211-226. 
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Migration 
Migration refers to the movement of people across jurisdictions (both within and across 
sovereign states) and can be characterized as a system of interactions.46  Migration has been 
described as “an extremely varied and complex manifestation and component of equally complex 
economic, social, cultural and political processes operating at the local, regional, national and 
international levels.”47    The linkages between migration and security are complex and may take 
several different forms.  Differentiating the processes, related to migration from the social, 
economic, political and institutional structures of which they are a part, is problematic.48  
Subsequently, establishing a linear relationship between migration and security is difficult, but 
we will attempt to identify certain cases where migration plays an important role as a contributor 
to insecurity.  Distinguishing these linkages is useful by considering a) the determinants of 
migration, including the role of environmental factors on stimulating or forcing out-migration or 
on attracting in-migration; and b) the effects of migration on destination and departure areas, 
focusing also on their effects on the environment.49   
   We have characterized the factors that affect migration as ‘push’ factors (in the place of 
origin) and ‘pull’ factors (in the place of destination).  Environmental variables may be an 
element in both.  Environmental push factors include both natural disasters as well as human-
induced environmental degradation.  Environmental pull factors may include the attraction of 
good farmland or a better growing climate.  Environmental change that adversely affects land 
                                                 
46 Choucri, Nazli.  “Migration and Security: Some Key Linkages.”  Journal of International Affairs 56, No. 1 (Fall 
2002): 97.  
47 Castles, Stephen, and Mark J. Miller. The age of migration: international population movements in the modern 
world. New York: Guilford Press, 1993. 
48 Lonegran, Steve, Dr. The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population Displacement.  Global 
Environmental Change and Human Security Project: Research Report 1 (2nd Edition).  Victoria, B.C: University of 
Victoria.  (July 1998): 5. 
49 Bilsborrow, Richard.  “Migration, Population Change, and the Rural Environment.”  Environmental Change and 
Security Project Report, Issue 8. The Woodrow Wilson Center. (Summer 2002): 69-94. 
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productivity tends to reduce agricultural incomes and stimulate out-migration.50  Environmental 
degradation in such instances may constitute a root cause of out-migration and the decline in 
crop yields only the proximate cause.51 
 We can observe the consequences of migration in terms of human security threats 
through two forms of traditional instability related to migration: internal migration conflicts, and 
cross-border migration conflicts and may be triggered by either voluntary migration or forced 
displacement.  Internal migration is often induced by structural environmental changes such as 
persistent drought, flood and soil erosion.  Individuals tend to migrate from depressed areas to 
more favorable zones such as fertile rural or urban areas.  Forced displacement and expulsion 
may appear in connection with large industrial mining and dam projects or through violent 
means by groups seeking to capture a region’s resources. 
Intra-regional migration and displacement may trigger tensions, clashes, resource 
competition, and in some cases violent conflicts between newcomers and settled populations. 
These conflicts are in part determined by environmental discrimination against actors who are 
heavily dependent on scarce natural resources. Violent conflicts (skirmishes, clashes and riots) 
usually occur in disputed rural zones (the San Juan region between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, 
for example).  Some conflicts, however, may spread to urban areas and blend with existing 
patterns of urban violence.  Intra-regional migration can also lead to political struggles for state 
power if and when groups that had been discriminated against succeed in penetrating the ruling 
elite or driving it out of power in other ways.52 
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
51 Shaw, R. Paul.  “Rapid population growth and environmental degradation: Ultimate versus proximate factors.”  
Environmental Conservation 16, No. 3 (1989): 199-208. 
52 Baechler, Gunther.  “Why Environmental Transformation Causes Violence: A Synthesis.”  Environmental 
Change and Security Project Report, Issue 4. The Woodrow Wilson Center. (Spring 1998): 24-44.   
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 Environmentally induced migration usually takes the form of slow infiltration over a long 
period of time.  People move into areas that either permit survival or provide more favorable 
living conditions.  In many regions it may be advantageous to cross a national frontier if more 
favorable foreign destinations are geographically nearer than the remote capital of one’s native 
country.  Frustration and despair can create social tensions in host countries or transboundary 
regions populated by hostile identity groups (or earlier migrants from common identity groups) 
who display hostile attitudes toward the newcomers.  Internal and cross-border migration pose 
serious threats to human security due to their inherent social and political destabilizing effects as 
well as their negative impacts on the natural environment.  Migration processes often prompt 
local populations to engage in practices of land intensification in order to meet economic needs.  
The degradation of productive land tends to create shortages of renewable resources (water, 
cropland, forests, etc.), which in turn generates environmental scarcities.53  These scarcities may 
producing mass movements of people fleeing major environmental disruptions. 
When migrants or refugees cross national borders, resettling in rural border areas or 
urban areas, they may pose a threat to the national security of the recipient state.  Migration and 
environmental discrimination may be linked, and environmental disruption may result as a 
consequence of large refugee movements.54  At the same time, environmental transformation is 
itself a reason for migration or flight.  Migration channeled by environmental discrimination may 
also increase the likelihood of conflict, especially in areas with poor macroeconomic 
performance or political instability. The current debate concerning environmental refugees 
                                                 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ogata, Sadako.  “Environmental Refugees and Social Conflict.”  Statement by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, in Baechler, Gunther, ed.  Environmental Refugees, A Potential of Future Conflicts.  
Muenster: 1994. 
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illustrates migration’s potential for destabilization, although evidence to this impact remains 
weak.   
Urbanization 
Increases in population and migration may pose an increasing threat to national security.  
Rapid (and some might argue, excessive) urban migration and the corresponding emergence of 
mega-cities (population of ten million or more) may pose a significant challenge to existing 
institutions.  High levels of urbanization coupled with low levels of GDP per capita may pose a 
threat to political stability.  Rapid urbanization not only increases the demand for public services 
and infrastructure, but also may overwhelm the capacity of local governments.  Demand for 
public services is not offset by increases in revenue, as there is often a persistent mismatch 
between employment opportunities and the size and quality of the labor force. Much of the low-
grade employment growth, moreover, is drawn into urban communities, swelling them far 
beyond their real economic base.55  The resulting urban underclass may turn to violence as public 
and private institutions fail to meet their basic needs.   
   Environmental refugees often head for urban areas, although socioeconomic conditions 
may be worse in the cities.  Finding a lack of economic opportunities they often continue to 
migrate until their resources are exhausted at which point they turn to the state for assistance.  In 
Mexico, for example, impoverished people tend to migrate first to Mexico City and other urban 
communities.  In many cases, they then migrate to the United States.  The United States thus has 
an express (and financially significant) interest in the flow of environmental refugees seeking 
improved economic prospects.  
                                                 
55 Myers, Norman.  Environmental Exodus: An Emergent Crisis in the Global Arena.  Washington, D.C.: Climate 
Institute, 1995. 
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Another consequence of this rapid urbanization and migration is an increasing rate of 
urban instability that disrupts domestic order and threatens political stability.  Over the past 
several decades, massive public protests and riots in cities throughout the developing world have 
resulted in significant loss of life and widespread destruction of property.  Such disturbances 
have been triggered by economic circumstances (e.g., rising food prices, food scarcity, currency 
devaluation) or by political upheavals.  In Latin America, powerful narcotics constituencies offer 
economic opportunities in cities with otherwise over-burdened economic bases, which 
increasingly threatens the exercise of sovereignty and the rule of law.  Beyond the direct 
economic costs, urban crime erodes the state by corrupting institutions (including the judiciary, 
the media and even security forces) and co-opting segments of the population.56  Urban 
disturbances not only destroy physical capital but also discourage foreign direct investment, 
inhibiting economic growth and political stability.  
The environmental stresses associated with urban areas contribute to the weakening of 
state institutions.  Urban environmental problems include the spatial concentration of people, 
industry, commerce, vehicles, energy consumption, water use, and waste generation, among 
others.57  Water contamination issues, for example, burden state institutions that lack the 
resources to detect chemical contamination or establish water treatment facilities.  Sanitation is a 
major problem affecting water quality in urban areas.  As cities become more densely populated, 
the per-household volumes of wastewater may exceed the infiltration capacity of local soils and 
require greater drainage capacity and improved sewer systems.  Most municipally provided 
                                                 
56 Brennan-Galvin, Ellen.  “Crime and violence in an urbanizing world.”  Journal of International Affairs 56, No. 1 
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57 Bartone, Carl R., Janis Bernstein, and Josef Leitman.  “Managing the Environmental Challenge of Mega-Urban 
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 25
sanitation systems, however, are based on conventional sewer systems.58  Coverage is generally 
inadequate, sewers are in poor condition and sewage treatment plants discharge effluents that are 
little better than raw sewage.  Providing partial service, or service that is intermittent, may 
impact human health and exacerbate existing environmental problems because sanitation is a 
service that depends on consistent and reliable coverage.59    
 Urbanization, as expected, has also resulted in widespread urban poverty and chaotic 
cities.  Zoning regulations are largely absent, allowing usage of a single space for a variety of 
activities.  Some of these activities increase both the likelihood of exposing the population to 
industrial pollution, as well as the probability of an environmental threat developing from 
contamination and waste proliferation.60  This consequent lack of urban planning often leads to 
the creation of slums or shantytowns on the city’s outskirts, a phenomenon that we observe in 
Latin America and other developing countries.  We can also now see a similar phenomenon in 
the United States as a result of immigration from Latin America.61 
El Salvador: Environmental Security or Economic Development? While El Salvador is 
the most densely populated country in Latin America, its urbanization rate is behind that of the 
Latin American region, with 62% of 6.5 million residents living in urban areas, compared to 76% 
                                                 
58 Brennan, Ellen M. “Population, Urbanization, Environment, and Security: A Summary of the Issues.” 
Environmental Change and Security Project Report, Issue 5. The Woodrow Wilson Center. (Summer 1999): 4-14. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Roberts, Bryan R. “Urbanization and the Environment in Developing Countries: Latin America in Comparative 
Perspective.” Chapter 10 in Population & Environment Rethinking the Debate. Lourdes Arizipe, M. Priscilla Stone, 
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61 See Richman, Neal and Bill Pinkin. Urban Slum Reports: the Case of Los Angeles, USA. Case Studies for the 
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 26
of the Latin American population as a whole.62  In the past three decades, we have witnessed a 
change in the composition of economic activity with a shift from the agricultural sector to the 
industry and service sectors.63  This shift in economic activity is mirrored in the demographic 
composition of El Salvador. 
According to Programa Salvaderaño de Investigación Sobre Desarrollo y Medio 
Ambiente (PRISMA), the urban population in El Salvador grew 164% between 1971 and 2000 
while the rural population only grew 24%.  Population growth has not been homogenously 
distributed across urban areas with 67% of the growth concentrated in the south surrounding the 
city of San Salvador.  The rapidly growing assembly industry (maquila) accounted for 17% of 
the foreign exchange in 2000, displacing traditional agricultural exports that accounted for 11% 
of foreign exchange in 2000, a significant decrease from the 80% generated in 1978.  In rural 
areas, non-agricultural employment has increased rapidly, from 39% of the rural workforce in 
1980 to 53% of the workforce in 2000, surplanting agriculture as the primary employer of the 
rural population. 
While we have observed a marked decline in the relative importance of agriculture in El 
Salvadoran economic activity, we have not observed a corresponding shift in labor from 
agriculture.   In 1980, 37.5% of the workforce was engaged in agricultural activities, only 
declining to 21.8% in 2001, even though agriculture as a percentage of GDP declined from 
37.96% in 1980 to 9.44% in 2001.64  This suggests a marginalization of the economic activity of 
those individuals in the agricultural sectors relative to the industrial and services sectors.  
                                                 
62 World Bank. World Development Indicators. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Group, 2003. (2002 population 
data.) 
63 Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. [Accessed 9/23/04]. 
64 World Bank. World Development Indicators. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Group, 2003.  In comparison, 
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Economic marginalization of the agricultural workforce, further exacerbated by 
inequitable land distribution patterns in El Salvador, may be a contributor to internal conflict and 
emigration.  The roots of the El Salvadoran Civil War (1980-1992) arguably lie in an established 
pattern of unequal land distribution that provoked the rise of a guerilla insurgency.65   The Peace 
Accords negotiated following the civil war in 1992 between the El Salvadoran government and 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) rebels established a land transfer program to 
re-integrate former combatants into civil society, although the success of this program remains a 
matter of debate.  Land redistribution efforts, while still not perfect, have facilitated the 
acquisition of household assets, to include housing and credit.  Land redistribution also appears 
to provide a buffer to external shocks (commodity prices, government prices, etc).  The 
government, in an effort to assist the poor agricultural sector, passed a debt relief law in 1996 
that forgave 70% of the agrarian debt and gave $575 to individual parcel holders if they paid the 
debt off in one year; the government also passed a second law directly aimed at breaking up 
collectively held lands.66    
According to the Inventory of Conflict and Environment, El Salvadoran government 
surveys dating from 1978 to 1982 showed that only 17% of El Salvador’s land area could be 
classified as high quality soil suitable for intensive agricultural use although 29% varied in 
quality and acceptability for agricultural use; 35% was of a poorer quality, more susceptible to 
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erosion and best suitable either for forest or grazing, while 13% was classified as severely 
degraded.67   
Despite these classifications, nearly half of the land appropriate for intensive agricultural use was 
underutilized while three-quarters of the crop cultivation was on marginal, degraded land.  The 
underutilized land generally belongs to that of the wealthy elite while the marginal land belongs 
to that of the subsistence farmer.  As a result, subsistence farming increasingly is not viable as a 
means to maintain livelihoods of the poor, rural population.  Food security, as well as rapid and 
increased levels of environmental degradation of the land, is a growing concern in El Salvador 
given the aforementioned inequitable land distribution and use.   
Landless rural families are more susceptible to shocks than those with access to land and 
are more likely to remove their children from school when confronting external shocks than 
those with land access.  If the landless poor, in reaction to shocks, withdraw their children from 
school and limit their ability to receive an education and instruction, they adversely impact their 
children’s future ability to overcome employment entry barriers.  While the importance of 
agricultural employment is decreasing in rural areas, the poor, without access to other means of 
employment are, to a greater extent, forced to abandon their lands, thus contributing to the higher 
rates of urbanization and emigration.   As the economic marginalization of agricultural workers 
increases, their vulnerability to external shocks, including that of environmental degradation, 
increases accordingly.  We argue that the evolution of the El Salvadoran economy has left a 
relatively large segment of the workforce vulnerable to shocks and thus this evolution indirectly 
undermines the security of the El Salvadoran state and its neighbors. If this hypothesis holds, we 
should observe an increase in internally displaced persons (IDPs).  Anecdotal evidence suggests 
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that these flows of individuals exist and have increased over time.  Unfortunately, neither the El 
Salvadoran government, other governments in Latin America, nor the UNHCR tracks individuals 
displaced by environmental degradation or economic marginalization.68   
Given the absence of credible data on IDPs, we must rely on indirect measures of the 
impact of environmental degradation and economic marginalization.  The development of the El 
Salvadoran economy has increased relative wages in the manufacturing sector, slowing the pace 
of emigration of skilled workers.  The vulnerability of workers in the agricultural sector, 
however, has led to a marked increase in the emigration of lower skilled labor over the last ten 
years.  Internal migration (24%) has given way to direct emigration to the United States and 
Canada (72%).  This marked increase in individuals displaced in search of economic 
opportunities appears to be mirrored in many other countries in Latin America.  The adjustment 
lag between economic activity and the composition of the workforce not only poses a security 
challenge to Latin American countries, but also to that of the United States.  
We argue that the evolution of the Latin American economies affects the national 
security of the United States.  In support of this argument, one need only look to the flow of 
individuals from Latin American to the United States over the past four decades relative to 
overall population growth in Latin American and the United States.  Overall, the number of 
foreign-born nationals from Latin American countries has increased from 908,309 in 1960 (9.3% 
of the U.S. population) to 16,086,974 in 2000 (51.7% of the U.S. population). Due to increased 
immigration, remittances occupy a larger role in rural areas with the number of households in 
rural areas receiving remittances increasing from 13% in 1992 to 20% in 2000.  By 2000, 
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remittances provided a full two-thirds of the foreign exchange of El Salvador and are a 
significant source of foreign exchange for many other Latin American countries.  
Given the significant expenditures of public resources to mitigate this flow and the 
commensurate expenditure of public resources to support these individuals once they succeed in 
reaching the United States, one may conclude that unchecked immigration can be considered a 
threat to national security.  The dependence of the Latin American economies on remittances 
suggests that efforts by the United States to reduce the flow of immigrants may pose a threat to 
their economic, and thus, national security.  Environmental degradation may thus, indirectly pose 
a significant concern to the security institutions of Latin America and the United States.   
 
Conclusions 
The issue of potential human and environmental security threats in Latin America is 
complex.  A vast number of variables, both independent and dependent, are at play and their 
linkages are still not fully understood.  Most analysis of security threats falls short when 
attempting to link the variables, usually attempting to focus too narrowly on the linkages while 
ignoring key interactions.  Given the complexity of the issue, one cannot reduce the analysis to 
include only the interactions between merely two variables.  Variable’s interactions may be 
simplified initially, perhaps, but they cannot overlook relevant associations when asserting final 
conclusions.   
 A large problem with analysis of the human and environmental security equation, and its 
subsequent linkages to environmental and demographic change, is the lack of consensus and 
sound empirical research.  A point probably most evident from this paper is a definite absence of 
substantial research attempting to relate and explain the relationships and interactions between 
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the variables of human and environmental security, population growth, migration, urbanization, 
environmental degradation and environmental scarcity.  We have attempted to identify the 
foundational questions in the literature that have yet to be addressed and to note where a lack of 
credible analysis calls conclusions into question.    
 Although this paper is directed at the security concerns of Latin America, the problems 
are assuredly similar to those of other developing nations.  Latin American is not alone in its 
high levels of poverty, rapid urbanization and susceptibility to climate change and other variables 
thought to impact human and environmental security.  Developing countries, however, are not 
the only ones that should look to Latin America for insight on security threats.  
 What remains central to this debate is whether individuals are fleeing environmental 
degradation or searching for improved economic opportunities.  We suspect that a combination 
of factors influences the emigration decision and that studies suggesting that only one factor is 
involved are, perhaps, biased in their conclusions.  The tradeoffs or synergies are yet to be 
explicitly quantified between environmental and economic factors and the resultant impact on 
the security of the emigrating and immigrating states.  We leave these questions for future 
research. 
 
